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Respondents Clover Club Foods and CIGNA Insurance 
Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Clover Club") 
hereby file their response to Petitioner's Petition for Review on 
appeal to this Court from the Industrial Commission. The 
Industrial Commission denied Petitioner's Motion for Review of 
the Administrative Law Judge's order denying Petitioner's claim 
for worker's compensation benefits. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-82.53(2) (1988) 
§ 31-1-86 (1988), § 63-46b-16 (1988), and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988) 
and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Petitioner is correct that the fundamental issue in 
this case is whether his claim for worker's compensation benefits 
is barred by the "going and coming" rule, or whether that rule 
does not apply due to the application of the "special hazards" 
exception. However, that question in this case raises two 
different issues on appeal, each with a different standard of 
review. The first issue is whether the railroad tracks were a 
proximate cause of the accident. This is a question of fact and 
the proper standard of review is the "substantial evidence" test. 
Findings of fact are affirmed if they are "supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
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before the court." Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 911 
(Utah App. 1992), citing Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d, 
134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code Annotated 63-46(b)-
16(4)(g)(1989)). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla 
of evidence, but less than the weight of the evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
The second issue is whether the Commission acted 
properly in finding that the Petitioner's claim of "heavy 
traffic" and complaints of snow and ice on the road and in the 
air did not constitute special hazards within the meaning of the 
special hazards exception. To the extent the Petitioner 
challenges a finding by the Commission regarding whether those 
claimed special hazards were a proximate cause of the accident, 
it is a question of fact and subject to the substantial evidence 
test set forth above. Petitioner's claims of heavy traffic and 
poor visibility are not supported by the evidence in the record, 
and cannot be found to have been a cause of the accident. To the 
extent the Petitioner's claim is that the Commission erred in 
determining that those matters are not special hazards within the 
meaning of exception, the standard of review is correctness based 
upon Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 
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1992); and King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1291-92 
(Utah App. 1993).* 
Respondents suggest, however, that the Court's 
determination in those two cases is incorrect, and that a grant 
of discretion to interpret the statute has been given to the 
Industrial Commission regarding § 35-1-45. The Cross case did 
not analyze the statute other than to conclude that it did not 
expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the Industrial 
Commission. Similarly, the decision in King also turns upon the 
fact that § 35-1-45 itself does not contain a directive to 
interpret or apply a statutory term. Respondents submit that 
there has been a grant of discretion to the Industrial Commission 
regarding the interpretation and application of the statutory 
phrase "by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment," and the proper standard of review should be the 
reasonable and rational test. See, e.g., Department of Air Force 
v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991). 
This Court, in applying pre-UAPA law, found that the 
intermediate standard of review of reasonable and rational was 
proper in reviewing a determination regarding whether an 
industrial accident occurred under § 35-1-45 in Stouffer Food 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 801 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1990). 
Neither King nor Cross explain why that determination in the 
Stouffer Food decision was wrong, or explain why the result 
should be different when the Commission interprets the issue of 
legal causation under § 35-1-45 at issue in Stouffer Food, as 
opposed to the issues addressed in King and Cross. 
Looking at all of the Worker's Compensation Act shows 
several grounds to conclude that a grant of discretion has been 
given to the Commission by the statutory framework to interpret 
what constitutes a compensable industrial accident. First, § 35-
1-16(1) (a) explicitly authorizes the Industrial Commission to 
"enforce all laws for protection of the life, health, safety, and 
welfare of employees." Presumably that charge encompasses the 
Worker's Compensation Act itself. Additionally, the various 
statutes which permit award of various types of compensation, 
such as the one under which the Petitioner seeks recovery here, 
§ 35-1-66 (permanent partial impairment benefits), imply that the 
Industrial Commission has the discretion to determine whether an 
industrial accident is compensable. Section 35-1-66 states that 
"an employee who sustains a permanent impairment as a result of 
an industrial accident . . . may receive a permanent partial 
disability award from the Commission." The Commission must make 
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a determination as to whether a compensable industrial accident 
occurred in order to even reach the issue of the amount, if any, 
of benefits to be awarded. See, e.g., Willardson v. Industrial 
Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 1993) 
(the Commission must find medical causation before the extent of 
permanent partial disability is at issue.) 
If the Industrial Commission does not have discretion 
to interpret a statute so fundamental to its operations as § 35-
1-45, it is hard to imagine where the Court would find an 
implicit grant of discretion. Under the analysis set forth in 
King, 850 P.2d at 1291, a review of the statutory framework in 
this situation clearly shows an implicit grant of discretion. 
The statutory language involved is broad and expansive and 
subject to numerous interpretations. This fact is demonstrated 
by the number of cases of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
which have been devoted to addressing the meaning of various 
portions of § 35-1-45. Similarly, it is hard to argue that the 
statute is unambiguous and susceptible to "traditional methods of 
statutory construction." This case is a good example of that, 
since the issue is the determination of what are special hazards 
so as to give rise to an exception to a rule which itself is a 
gloss on the statute imposed by the case law. There is little in 
the language of § 35-1-45 which gives guidance in determining how 
to resolve what specific items are special hazards, or what, if 
anything, the legislature intended concerning that issue. 
Finally, there are serious adverse policy implications 
of the current standard of review of decisions regarding § 35-1-
45. If decisions of the Commission concerning what constitutes a 
compensable accident and what accidents are found to arise out of 
or in the course of employment are all reviewed on a correctness 
basis by the Court of Appeals, that would encourage a flood of 
appeals, since the fact intensive determination by the Commission 
could easily be challenged on a correctness standard. The 
Industrial Commission's expertise and decades of experience in 
addressing issues concerning what constitutes compensable 
industrial accidents should be respected, and the reasonable and 
rational test should be applied. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-45 is the determinative 
statute in this case. It is reproduced in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's order 
denying his Motion for Review of the ALJ's denial of workers 
compensation benefits. The ALJ denied worker's compensation 
benefits on the grounds that the Petitioner did not suffer an 
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing for 
permanent partial disability benefits. (R. 1.) Clover Club 
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Petitioner's 
claim was barred by the going and coming rule because he was 
injured while driving to work. (R. 19-24.) A hearing was 
scheduled for September 8, 1992. (R. 65.) At the hearing, the 
ALJ heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed 
the claim as a matter of law because the accident did not arise 
out of and in the course of employment and there was no special 
hazard proven regarding the conditions of the street at the time 
of the accident. (R. 66, 68-75.) Petitioner filed a Motion for 
Review on October 9 (R. 76), and the Industrial Commission denied 
the Motion for Review on March 12, 1993. The Commission affirmed 
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and adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, finding that heavy traffic was not a special hazard, that 
the train tracks had no causal relationship to the accident, and 
that the weather conditions, visibility and icy roads did not 
constitute a special hazard because they were not peculiar to the 
Petitioner's employment. (R. 115-119.) 
Statement of Facts. 
The Petitioner was driving to work on January 15, 1991. 
While preparing to turn left onto Industrial Parkway off of 700 
South in Clearfield, Utah, approximately 7/10ths of a mile from 
his place of employment, he was struck from behind by a vehicle 
driven by Paul Mumford. (R. 70.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "going and coming" rule excludes compensation for 
injuries suffered on the way to and from work because they do not 
"arise out of and in the course of employment." Special hazards 
particularly related to a route the employee must take to get to 
work which cause an injury are exceptions to that rule, and 
permit compensation. Here, Petitioner was injured on his way to 
work when his car was rear-ended on a snow-covered street. That 
is not a compensable accident. 
Petitioner asserts four alleged special hazards. 
First, he relies on the fact that there were train tracks which 
crossed 700 South more than l/10th of mile away from the site of 
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the accident. However, a compensable special hazard must be a 
proximate cause of the accident. In this case, the ALJ found 
that there was no causal relationship between the tracks and the 
accident, and the Petitioner has totally failed to marshal any 
evidence to show that the Commissions finding is not supported 
by substantial evidence. Indeed, reference to the distance from 
the railroad tracks to the site of the accident alone is 
substantial evidence to show that the railroad tracks did not 
cause the accident. 
Second, the Petitioner relies upon a claim of "heavy 
traffic." However, Petitioner has not provided any authority 
that "heavy traffic" is in fact a special hazard, and the Utah 
Supreme Court in Cherne Construction v. Posso, 735 P.2d 384, 385 
(Utah 1987), noted that it "could find no case law" to support a 
theory that heavy traffic was such a hazard. 
Finally, Petitioner relies upon claims relating to the 
weather that day — that it was snowy and that the roads were 
icy. The ALJ and the Commission found that those conditions were 
not special hazards which gave rise to risks peculiar to 
Petitioner's employment with Clover Club, and those transient 
conditions did not make his accident work-related. This is the 
correct conclusion, and none of the authority cited by Petitioner 
supports a different result. The order of the Industrial 
Commission should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE GOING AND COMING RULE PRECLUDES AN AWARD OF 
BENEFITS IN THIS MATTER. 
The Petitioner seeks worker's compensation benefits 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-45 (1988, as amended), 
which states in relevant part that benefits are to be awarded for 
injuries "by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment . . . " Travel to and from work is not generally 
considered to be within the course of employment, and therefore 
no compensation benefits are available. See, e.g., Higgins v. 
Industrial Commission. 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985); Soldier 
Creek Coal Company v. Bailev. 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985). 
As the Court in Bailey discussed, one exception to the 
going and coming rule is the so-called premises exception, where 
injuries occurring on the employer's premises are covered. In 
this case, as in Baileyf that exception is not at issue because 
the accident occurred on a public road. The second exception is 
for so-called "special hazards." The Utah Supreme Court has set 
forth four requirements to apply the special hazards exception: 
(1) There must be a close association 
of the access way with the employer's 
premises, usually meaning that it must be the 
only road to the work-place; 
(2) There must be a special hazard 
associated with this route; 
(3) The employee must be exposed to the 
special hazard because of his use of the 
route; and 
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(4) The special hazard must be the 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Id., citing 1 A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 15.13(b) (1985) (hereinafter "Larsen"). 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the first 
requirement is met, in this case (as in the Bailey case) the 
other requirements are not met because there is no special 
hazard. 
This case is perhaps most like Wilkinson v. Industrial 
Commission, 23 Utah 2d 428, 464 P.2d 589 (1970), where the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of compensation benefits to a 
worker who was injured while turning left out of his employer's 
parking lot. The Court noted that the employer's lot "abuts upon 
a wide street in the industrial part of the city, and there are 
no special hazards along the way. The only hazard at all is that 
type which every person has who enters or leaves a street." 464 
P.2d at 591. Similarly, the Petitioner's injuries here were 
suffered while he was waiting to turn left on his way to work and 
are not compensable. None of the four items he claims were 
"special hazards" are legitimate special hazards which would give 
rise to compensation. 
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A. The Railroad Tracks are of No Relevance to this 
Accident. 
The Petitioner first argues that the fact that railroad 
tracks crossed the road more than l/10th of a mile away from the 
scene of accident constitutes a compensable special hazard. 
While it is true that many special hazard cases involve railroad 
tracks, the Petitioner ignores the requirement that the special 
hazard must be the proximate cause of the accident. Bailey. 709 
P.2d at 1166. In this case, both the ALJ and the Industrial 
Commission found that the railroad tracks had no causal 
relationship with the accident. (R. 72, 117.) 
The Petitioner makes no attempt to attack the 
sufficiency of that factual finding by the Industrial Commission. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, it is clear that 
the Petitioner must marshal the evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding and then show that the finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g.. Grace Drilling Co. 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). In this 
case, the Petitioner made no attempt to marshal the evidence in 
support of the Commission's finding, let alone argue how the 
finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The only 
evidence in the record is that the railroad tracks had nothing to 
do with the accident, and the existence of a railroad crossing 
hundreds of feet away from the scene of the accident is of no 
consequence. This alone is substantial evidence that there was 
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no causal connection. Petitioner cannot challenge the 
Commission's factual finding on this matter due to his failure to 
marshal the evidence, and the Commission's decision should be 
affirmed. 
The Petitioner's argument in his brief that the other 
driver could not see him because of the "raised" railroad tracks 
is inconsistent with the facts in the record and the findings of 
the Commission. The amount the tracks are "raised" is minimal, 
if at all, as shown by Petitioner's own photograph 1. (R. 149.) 
Moreover, the affidavit of the other driver makes it clear that 
he saw Petitioner's car and tried to stop, but was unable to 
because of ice and snow on the road. (R. 153.) Additionally, 
the ALJ's finding that the tracks were more than a l/10th of a 
mile away from the intersection undermines and completely 
contradicts the applicant's intimation that once the other car 
had crossed the railroad tracks it was too late to avoid the 
accident. He clearly had ample opportunity to stop. 
As Professor Larsen states in his treatise: 
Note that [the special hazard exception] 
here involved contains two components. The 
first is the presence of a special hazard at 
the particular off-premises point. The 
second is the close association of the access 
route with the premises, so far as going and 
coming are concerned. 
The necessity for the first component 
needs some emphasis, since in occasional 
recent cases it seems to be overlooked. . . . 
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Suppose, for example, that a particular road, 
alley or sidewalk could meet the test of 
being the sole or normal access route to the 
plant. Suppose also that two railroad tracks 
ran across that route near the plant gate. 
Now assume that the employee suffered an 
unexplained fall, under circumstances that 
would have rendered it compensable under the 
decisions of the jurisdiction if it had 
happened during active employment. Would it 
be held compensable? It would not, although 
the injury from being struck down by a 
railway engine would be. The extended course 
of employment based upon the special hazard 
in the access route is valid only for that 
hazard. 
1 A. Larsen at § 15.13(b), pp. 4-35 to 4-39 (emphasis in 
original). The hazard asserted here — the railroad tracks — 
has no connection to the injury, and does not make the accident 
compensable. 
B. "Heavy Traffic" is not a Special Hazard Giving 
Rise to Compensation. 
Next, the Petitioner claims that there is a so-called 
special hazard of "heavy traffic." The Petitioner first 
overlooks the fact that there is no evidence in the record to 
support a determination that the amount of traffic was "heavy" or 
was a proximate cause of the accident. According to both the 
police report and the affidavit of the driver of the other car, 
the accident was caused by the other car sliding on ice. (See. 
R. at 70, 57, 152, and 153.) The amount of traffic simply does 
not enter into the discussion regarding the cause of the 
accident. 
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Moreover, heavy traffic on a public street in a town, 
which is not directly related to the injured worker's employment, 
should not be considered a hazard. In Cherne Construction v. 
Posso, 735 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court noted 
that it was aware of no case authority to support a claim that 
"heavy traffic" was a special hazard. Similarly, the Court's 
holding in Wilkinson, 464 P.2d 589, supports that conclusion, 
since it noted that turning left presented no more hazard than 
that which every person encounters who enters or leaves a street. 
Similarly, other hazards of traffic which are common to everyone 
using the roads should not be considered a special hazard. 
Finally, none of the cases cited in the Petitioner's 
brief support his argument that so-called "heavy traffic" should 
be a special hazard. The Petitioner has simply failed to provide 
any evidence that heavy traffic existed, or was a cause of the 
accident, let alone any authority that even if there had been 
heavy traffic, it could be considered a special hazard to 
establish compensability. 
C. Poor Visibility Due to Snow is Not a Special 
Hazard and Was Not a Proximate Cause of This 
Accident. 
The Petitioner's arguments regarding poor visibility, 
were not even raised in the initial response to the motion to 
dismiss. (R. 28). They also ignore the fact that both the 
police officer and the other driver concluded that the accident 
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happened because of slipping on the ice, not because of any 
inability to see the Petitioner's car. Finally, and 
dispositively, the Findings of Fact of the Commission (which are 
not challenged by the Petitioner) do not make any findings 
regarding poor visibility. Therefore, there is no basis for the 
Petitioner to argue that poor visibility was a cause of the 
accident and it therefore cannot qualify as a special hazard 
giving rise to compensability. 
The Petitioner also cannot provide any authority that 
poor visibility caused by the weather is a special hazard under 
any circumstances. None of the cases the Petitioner cites 
support that conclusion. In Diffendaffer v. Clifton. 91 Idaho 
751, 430 P.2d 497 (1967), the accident occurred due to the 
obscured vision from the dust on the road caused by the caravan 
of co-employees being led by their foreman to a remote job site. 
That is hardly the situation here, and is no support for a claim 
that poor visibility due to rain or snow while driving in town 
should give rise to additional worker's compensation liability 
for employers. 
Similarly, in Narania Rock Company v. Dawal Farms. 74 
So.2d 282 (Florida 1954), the applicant recovered because he ran 
into a tree which was in the right-of-way adjacent to the company 
property which he was using during a break in his work. The 
court held: 
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...that the accident in this case 
arose out of and in the course of 
claimant's employment where/ under 
the circumstances here presented, 
the claimant during an enforced 
lull in his work, with implied 
permission to leave his employer's 
premises, was injured by reason by 
a particular hazard existing in the 
roadway immediately adjacent to the 
premises of his employer. 
Id. 74 So.2d at 286-287. It is clear that the hazard existing in 
the roadway was the tree, not anything related to the weather. 
Finally, Petitioner cites elsewhere in his brief the case of 
Bechtel Corporation v. Winther, 262 Ark. 361, 556 S.W.2d 882 
(1977). In that case the existence of a special hazard was not 
an issue on appeal, but the hazard involved was the road, which 
was a causeway across a lake with no shoulders and no guardrails. 
While there was reference in the case to poor visibility due to 
fog, that was not the basis for the special hazard determination. 
Neither the facts nor the law support Petitioner's 
attempt to reverse the Commission on the issue of alleged poor 
visibility, and the Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
D. Transient Ice and Snow on the Road Do Not 
Constitute a Special Hazard in This Case. 
Petitioner's final claim for a special hazard relates 
to the transient road conditions that day due to the weather. 
Unlike the other three issues, there is evidence to support a 
conclusion that the road conditions were a proximate cause of the 
accident, but there is no support for the claim that road 
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conditions due to weather are properly considered a special 
hazard to make the employer liable. There is no evidence that 
the road conditions at the place of the accident presented any 
different hazard than those faced by all drivers in Clearfield on 
that day regardless of their purpose. As the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
The major premise of the 
"going and coming" rule is that it 
is unfair to impose unlimited 
liability on an employer for 
conduct of its employees over which 
it has no control and from which it 
derives no benefit. 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.. 801 P.2d 934, 
937 (Utah 1989). The requirements for application of the 
special hazard exception state that not only must the special 
hazard be "associated with the route", but that the employee must 
be "exposed to the special hazard because of his use of the 
route". Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey. 709 P.2d 1165, 
1166 (emphasis added). In other words, hazards which are not 
particularly associated with the route but are generally a threat 
to all people are not compensable special hazards. This was 
spelled out in one of Utah's early cases on the special hazards 
exception, where the Court stated that: 
One of such exceptions is where an 
injury results because of a danger 
or peril incident to the use of a 
particular method or means of 
approach to the place of work. 
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Fidelity & Casualty Co, v. Industrial Commission,79 Utah 189, 
8 P.2d 617, 618 (1932). The snow and ice on the road (and in the 
air) were not incident to the use of the route the Petitioner 
took to work, but rather the result of the fact that it was 
snowing that day in that part of the state. This accident could 
have as easily occurred at any point along the way to work, or on 
the way to any other errand. That is precisely the kind of 
liability that the going and coming rule is intended to exclude. 
Transient weather conditions do not turn an otherwise 
noncompensable accident on the way to work into a compensable 
accident. The Industrial Commissions determination on this 
issue is correct and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence or in any 
way challenge the conclusion that the railroad tracks had no 
cause or relationship to the accident. The Commission's 
conclusions regarding the other three claimed special hazards are 
clearly correct and therefore must be affirmed. The policy 
impact of awarding worker's compensation benefits for injuries 
claimed to have been suffered in traffic accidents going to or 
from work due to factors such as the weather, the visibility, or 
traffic conditions would be disastrous and has no rational 
connection to the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act to 
compensate workers for injuries they suffer at work. It would be 
-17-
unfair to impose liability on employers for accidents for which 
they can have no responsibility or over which they can have no 
control. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments Respondents request 
that the Order of the Industrial Commission be affirmed.2 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven J. A^schbacher 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Clover Club Foods and CIGNA 
SJA:52372 
Respondents note that the relief requested by the 
Petitioner is not only unsupported by the facts and the law, but 
is improper. In the event the Petitioner were entitled to remand 
(which he clearly is not, it would be inappropriate to direct an 
award or even a referral to a medical panel with the case in this 
posture. 
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ADDENDUM 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1; 1988, ch. 
116, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend-
ment substituted "as provided in this chapter" 
in the first sentence for "as is herein provided"; 
added the second sentence; and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, 
substituted "Each employee mentioned in 
§ 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of and" for "Every employee men-
tioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and 
the dependents of every such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of or" in the first 
sentence. 
Cross-References. — Miner's hospital ser-
vice, as affected by compensation, § 35-6-1 et 
seq. 
Occupational diseases generally, § 35-2-1 et 
seq. 
